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Abstract 
By using the latest dataset from the survey of SMEs conducted in Vietnam in 
2011, we show that a firm both participating in a wider network of input suppliers, 
buyers, and associations of enterprises and conducting innovative activities in 
production has higher labor productivity than others, implying that networks of 
enterprises and innovation are complementary to each other in affecting 
performance of SMEs in Vietnam. We also find that supports of the government 
including providing better infrastructure to the SMEs and helping the SMEs to be 
formalized when being established are conducive to the development of the SMEs in 
Vietnam.  
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Networks are considered important social capital of enterprises. Innovation is 
also widely known to be a key determinant of enterprise performance. A firm tends 
to change their technology and promote innovation to be suitable for a network that 
it is a member of it. At the same time, participating in a network influences 
innovations that a firm carries out and, subsequently, its overall performance.  
In Vietnam, enterprises in general and SMEs in particular are concentrated in 
big cities, where they can find it easier to have adequate supplies of inputs and larger 
customers. This phenomenon is often explained as the enterprises are taking 
advantages of agglomeration economy, about which there are numerous studies. By 
locating in big cities, enterprises are able to easily contact with their suppliers and 
customers, and, therefore, reduce transaction costs (Appold, 1995; Fujita & Thisse, 
2002; Sabel, Hirst, & Zeidin, 1989; Scott, 1988). More specifically, Mazzola and Bruni 
(2000), by estimating the probability of success of post‐entry performance of new 
firms in southern Italy, find that inter‐firm linkages contribute to success in 
production for order and subcontracting of these firms. On the relationship between 
inter‐firm linkages and innovations of firms, there are a great number of studies 
world‐wide. Nooteboom (1999) and Segarra‐Blasco and Arauzo‐Carod (2008) among 
others argue that inter‐firm linkages are important for innovations of enterprises. 
Machikita and Ueki (2010) also find that a variety of linkages are important 
determinants of innovations of firms in East Asia. 
Rigorous studies on the relationship between inter‐enterprise linkages and 
innovations of enterprises in Vietnam are, however, few. Anwar and Nguyen (2011) 
argue that horizontal and vertical linkages between FDI and domestic firms in 
Vietnam have positive effects on innovations on marketing including the decision of 
domestic firms to export and the export share of domestic firms. Besides, Nguyen et 
al. (2008) identified innovation is an important factor leading to export activities of 
SMEs in Vietnam. Furthermore, Nam et al. (2009) analyze the enterprises in a steel 
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and iron industrial cluster in northern Vietnam, which are concentrated in a small 
geographical village, and find that these enterprises carry out multifaceted 
innovations and linkages between family enterprises are important for such 
innovations. Nevertheless, there is no research that mentions about the 
compelementary between innovations and networks of SMEs, which play an essential 
role in recent economic development in Vietnam. This paper sheds a light on the issue 
by analyzing the networks and innovations of SMEs in Vietnam. 
The remaining this paper is organized as follows. The theory on complementarity 
between innovation and networking is discussed in Part 2. Theoretical framework for 
the paper and data are presented in Part 3. Empirical results and discussions are 
shown in Part 4. Main findings are summarized and conclusions are presented in the 
last part.  
2. Innovation, networking and their complementarity 
Theoretical framework to evaluate the effects of corporate system or 
organization called complementarity is provided on the basis of theories on 
supermodular optimization and games. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) applied this 
model to analyze structural change of a producing firm in order to fit their strategy. 
In particular, Arora (1996) suggests testing for complementarities in regression 
model. Later studies can test complementarity (Athey & Stern, 1998; Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2002; Galia & Legros, 2004; Guidetti, Mancinelli, & Mazzanti, 2008; 
Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003; Mohnen & Röller, 2005).  
Regarding the influence of management on firm performance, Athey and Stern 
(1998) employed alternative strategies to estimate the effect of organization design 
practices on performance in a cross‐section of firms. Furthermore, Laursen and Foss 
(2003) identify nine new factors in Human Resource Management (HRM) including 
interdisciplinary workgroups; quality circles; systems for collection of employee 
proposals; planned job rotation; delegation of responsibility; integration of functions; 
performance related pay; firm‐internal training; and firm‐external training. They 
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conclude that all nine above aspects of HRM affect innovating abilities.  Moreover, two 
factors related to individuals have high significance to innovation performance. On 
the other hand, innovation activities are complementary to each others. To illustrate, 
Cassiman & Veugelers (2002) used data from Community Innovation Survey of firm 
production in Belgium and find that there is complementarity between their own 
R&D and external technology sourcing activities.  
In another paper on obstacles of macro policies’ influence on firm’s innovation, 
Mohnen and Röller (2005) tested discrete complementarities in innovation policy 
using European data on obstacles to innovation and find that the evidence regarding 
the existence of complementarity in innovation policies depends on the phase of 
innovation that is targeted as well as on the particular pair of policies that is being 
considered. 
Another factor that affects networks of enterprises is physical infrastructure. 
Bharadwaj (2000) find that information technology infrastructure including system 
as a whole, resources, and intangible assets of IT, influences firm performance. In 
another study, Dollar, Hallward‐Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005) compared how 
firm performance among Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan is affected by 
investment in climate that consists of public infrastructure. They conclude that better 
infrastructure reduces corporate costs and positively influences firm performance.  
In this study, we advance the following hypotheses: 
H1. Innovation and network of enterprises positively affects performance, measured by 
labor productivity, of SMEs in Vietnam. 
H2. Supports of the government by providing better physical infrastructure to and 
helping the formalization of SMEs are important for the performance, measured by 
labor productivity, of SMEs in Vietnam. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Conceptual framework  
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Conceptually, this paper is to analyze effects of the complementarity between 
innovations and networks of enterprises on the performance of enterprises. In other 
words, we are going to identify whether innovations and networks complement each 
other to induce higher performance of enterprises. According to Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990, 1995); Milgrom and Shannon (1994); and Mancinelli and Mazzanti (2009); 
Topkis (1998),  the F(x) function is affected by xj = (xj1, xj2, …, xjk) variables, where k 
is the number of variables such as policy, consumer behavior, monopoly pass‐
through, Bertrand and Cournot competition, strategic R&D, search, or matching; and 
j is the number of value a variable takes on. For instance, if j=2, that variable is a 
dummy variable. We have to determine   variables xj such that the function F(x) 
reaches max or supermodular in its parameters. Following Athey and Stern (1998); 
Mancinelli and Mazzanti (2009); Mohnen and Röller (2005), a productivity function 
of an enterprise in this study (PRODi) contains two main variables: innovations and 
networks. 
PRODi = PRODi(IN, NET,Øi) ∀    (1)  
where, IN and NET are innovations and networks, respectively. In our dataset, 
they are dummy variables. IN equals to 1 if an enterprise has any innovation activities 
and  equals to 0 otherwise, i.e., IN(0,1). NET equals to 1 if an enterprise is in any formal 
networks such as an association of enterprises or has a wider network of input 
suppliers and/or buyers, i.e., NET(0,1).  Øi represents other exogenous variables 
representing history of enterprises, characteristics of the owners/managers, and 
infrastructure.  
Because IN and NET variables take on either value: 1 or 0. There are, hence, 
four possibilities that an enterprise state is, namely 00 (no innovations, no network); 
10 (no innovations, with network); 01 (with innovations; no network) and 11 (with 
both innovations and network). Variables IN and NET are complementary to each 
other through function PRODi that is supermodular if and only if: 
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PRODi(11, Øi) ‐ PRODi(00, Øi) ≥ [PRODi(10, Øi) ‐ PRODi(00, Øi)] + [PRODi(01, Øi) ‐ 
PRODi(00, Øi)] (2) 
If Inequation (2) holds, there is complementarity between innovations and 
network and, thus, the productivity function (PRODi) of an enterprise is a 
supermodular. 
Empirical model 
To test the hypotheses advanced earlier, we use a simple estimation as follows:  
PRODi = β0 + β1 (characteristics of enterprises) + β2 (link innovations and 
networks) + β3 (infrastructure as electricity, water, road, rail) + εi (3) 
where PRODi is the labor productivity of the enterprises in 2010 measured by 
the logarithm of value added divided by the number of full‐time workers. Value added 
is calculated by subtracting material costs and other costs except labor cost from 
revenue; εi is error term; β0 is intercept. Variables related to coefficients β1 and β3 are 
presented in Table 1. β2 is used to estimate the complementarity between innovations 
and networks of enterprises. It is noted that in this paper we measure the networks 
of an enterprise by whether the enterprise is a member of any formal associations 
and whether the enterprise has a wider networks of suppliers and buyers than others. 
We believe that an enterprise that has networks of suppliers and buyers, which are 
more distant, and more diversified than others tend have wider networks. 
If innovations and networks are complementary, PRODi function must be 
supermodular, i.e., (b1 + b2 – b3  ‐ b4) ≥0, where b1 is the coefficient of the 00 state (no 
innovations, no network); b2 is the coefficient of the 11 state (with both innovations 
and network); b3 is the coefficient of the 01 state (no innovations, only network); and 
b4 is the coefficient of the 10 state (only innovation, no network). We are going to one‐
sided t test with hypothesis H0:  [b1 + b2 – b3  ‐ b4] ≥0. H0 is expected not to be rejected 
so that we can conclude that there is complementarity among the innovations and 





We use the data from the Small and Medium Enterprises Vietnam Survey 
conducted in 2011 by Institute of Labour Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) in the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), Central Institute for 
Economic and Management (CIEM) and Department of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen with funding from SIDA and DANIDA. The surveyed enterprises are in 
10 cities/provinces in Vietnam including registered and informal ones. Due to some 
missing values, we finally use 2,494 observations in the dataset. 
Table 1 presents data description. The focus is on two groups of variables: 
innovations and networks. Firstly, the innovation variable equals to 1 if in 2010 an 
enterprise has at least one innovative activity out of three activities including 
introduction of new products; improvement of existing products; and introduction of 
new production processes/new technology. The innovation variable equals to 0 if 
otherwise. The variable for networks of suppliers takes on value of 1 if an enterprise 
is either importing machines/equipment from abroad, importing materials from 
overseas, or outsourcing its production. It takes on value of 0 if otherwise. The 
variable for networks of buyers equals to 1 if an enterprise is either exporting its 
products or subcontracting part(s) of its production.  
 
4. Regression results 
We apply the simple OLS estimation in this paper. In Table 2, from column (1) 
to column (3), firm size is a categorial‡ variable, which does not affect productivity. 
However, when firm size is a continuous variable in column from (4) to (6), it 
positively affects labor productivity of the enterprises, which is similar to previous 
findings in other countries (Mancinelli & Mazzanti, 2009; Wincent, 2005).  
  
                                                             
‡ According to World Bank Group, a microenterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons (size1), a small 
enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs from 10 to 50 persons (size2), a medium enterprise is defined as an enterprise which 
employs from 50 to 300 persons(size3) 
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Complementarity between innovations and networks 
As mentioned in Part 3, innovations and networks are binary variables, 
forming four dummy variables. We will find the condition so that PRODi function is 
supermodular or, in other words, there is complementarity between innovation and 
networking. We chose enterprises that had at least one type of innovations and have 
wider and more diversified networks as a base group. The coefficients of variables 
from inno_sup1 to inno_asso3 are negative and significant, suggesting that the 
productivity of enterprises that carried out innovations and had wider networks is 
higher than others. However, if an enterprise only carries out innovation and does 
not have a wider network (inno_sup2, inno_buyer2, inno_asso2 variables), the 
coefficients are insignificant or at 10% level of significance compared to base group, 
indicating that its productivity is not higher than enterprises that do not carry out 
innovation. It can be seen that enterprises with innovation activities perform better 
than those who only have wider networks. However, having both of them is the best 
for raising labor productivity.  
However, Athey and Stern (1998); Mohnen and Röller (2005) indentify some 
weak point of using regression model. Particularly, we cannot know whether there is 
complementarity between innovations and networks or whether there is satisying 
supermodular condition of PRODi functions. We run the regression in Table 2 again 
with no constant term to estimate all coefficients of variables related to innovations 
and networks. We, then, do one‐sided t‐test§ to test H0 mentioned in Part 3. We expect 
that we cannot reject H0, so there is complementarity between innovation and 
networking. 
Table 3 provides results of one‐sided t‐test with innovations, networks of 
suppliers; innovations, networks of buyers; and innovations, association variables. 
We conclude not to reject H0.  In other words, there is complementarity between 
                                                             




innovations and networks of SMEs in Vietnam. The first hypothesis is, thus, 
supported. 
Characteristics of enterprises and enterprise owners/managers 
Variable firmage has negative and highly significant effects on labor 
productivity of the enterprises, indicating that younger enterprises tend to be more 
dynamic. It is interesting to observe that the variable iformal has positive and highly 
significant effects, suggesting that an SME that was formally registered when being 
established tends to have higher labor productivity in 2010 than others. It is often 
costly and time consuming for very small and small enterprises to be registered 
without any supports from the governement. This finding confirms Hypothesis H2 
and implies that there is room for the government to promote SME development in 
Vietnam. 
The regressions also show that enterprises of the owners/managers who 
graduated universities tend to have higher labor productivity than others, suggesting 
that education of owners/managers is an important determinant of the enterprise 
performance.  
Physical infrastructure   
In Table 2, Columns from (1) to (6) show that there are two kinds of 
infrastructure positively affecting enterprises’ productivity. They are roads and 
electricity. If an enterprise finds it easy to access public electricity grids and roads, 
they will have higher productivity by around 33% and 9%, respectively, than those 
have more difficult access given that other factors are constant. This finding shows 
that the road and electricity systems in Vietnam do not meet requirements of the 
SMEs and SMEs in Vietnam need better access to such important services, which are 





With data on SMEs 2011 in Vietnam, we find evidence that local infrastructure 
where enterprise are situated and operate have significant influence on labor 
productivity of the SMEs. Main roads and public electricity grids affect the 
performance of SMEs positively and significantly. Moreover, initial support of the 
government in helping newly established enterprises to be formally registered also 
has positive effects on the labor productivity of the SMEs. These findings suggest 
important roles of the public sector in promoting the development of SMEs in 
Vietnam.  
More importantly, we find the positive influence of innovations and networks 
on the performance of SMEs and show evidence of the complementarity between 
innovations and networks in Vietnam. If an enterprise carry out innovations and have 
wider and more diversified networks of suppliers, buyers, and business associations, 
they will perform better than others. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables (N=2494) 
Variable Descriptions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnProductivity Log of productivity (Value added/employees) 10.86 0.77 7.50 15.41 
Innovation      
newProduct New product groups  0.04 0.20 0 1 
impProduct Improvements of existing products  0.38 0.49 0 1 
newProcess New production processes 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Network of Suppliers      
Immachine Imports (foreign equipment/machine) 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Outsource Outsource production  0.04 0.20 0 1 
importD Imports (foreign raw materials) 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Network of Buyers      
exportD Exporter 0.03 0.18 0 1 
sub Subcontractor 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Joining formal association     
associationD Member of one or more business associations 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Controls      
fullworker Number of Employees (fulltime) 14.04 27.84 1 321 
firmage Firm age 13.39 9.42 2 61 
iformal 
Formally registered business (formal = 1; 
informal=0) 0.42 0.49 0 1 
road Main road 0.78 0.42 0 1 
rail Easy access to rail 0.51 0.50 0 1 
port Easy access to port 0.39 0.49 0 1 
elec Access to public electricity grid 0.97 0.16 0 1 
water Access to public provided water system  0.67 0.47 0 1 
Characteristics of respondent     
gender Gender of respondent (1 = male; 0 = female) 0.63 0.48 0 1 
age Age of respondent 44.70 10.61 16 91 
kinh Ethnicity of respondent (Kinh=1; other=0) 0.93 0.25 0 1 
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primary Primary school 0.08 0.28 0 1 
lower Lower secondary 0.28 0.45 0 1 
upper Upper secondary 0.62 0.49 0 1 
uni University 0.24 0.43 0 1 
skill Skills of repondent (skills=1; unskills =0) 0.94 0.24 0 1 
cadre Village, commune, district, province cadre 0.03 0.17 0 1 
veteran War veteran 0.08 0.27 0 1 
dv Member of the Communist Party  0.10 0.29 0 1 
worksoe State enterprise (previous work) 0.20 0.40 0 1 
worknonsoe Non‐state enterprise  0.26 0.44 0 1 
selfindus Self‐employed in manufacturing‐construction  0.09 0.28 0 1 
selfser Self‐employed in trade/services  0.19 0.39 0 1 
Province      
prov1 Ha Noi 0.12 0.32 0 1 
prov2 Phu Tho 0.10 0.30 0 1 
prov3 Ha Tay 0.14 0.34 0 1 
prov4 Hai Phong 0.09 0.28 0 1 
prov5 Nghe An 0.14 0.34 0 1 
prov6 Quang Nam 0.06 0.24 0 1 
prov7 Khanh Hoa 0.04 0.19 0 1 
prov8 Lom Dong 0.03 0.18 0 1 
prov9 TP HCM 0.23 0.42 0 1 
prov10 Long An 0.05 0.22 0 1 




Table 2: Determinants of labor productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
size2 0.0381 0.0540 0.0509    
 (1.07) (1.50) (1.41)    
size3 0.0419 0.0507 0.0484    
 (0.61) (0.73) (0.68)    
lnEmp    0.0553*** 0.0643*** 0.0653*** 
    (3.36) (3.92) (3.91) 
inno_sup1 ‐0.255***   ‐0.226***   
 (‐6.87)   (‐5.99)   
inno_sup2 ‐0.108*   ‐0.0887*   
 (‐2.55)   (‐2.09)   
inno_sup3 ‐0.0747*   ‐0.0584   
 (‐2.16)   (‐1.68)   
inno_buyer1  ‐0.214***   ‐0.178**  
  (‐3.60)   (‐3.03)  
inno_buyer2  ‐0.108   ‐0.0876  
  (‐1.85)   (‐1.51)  
inno_buyer3  ‐0.229**   ‐0.200*  
  (‐2.68)   (‐2.35)  
inno_asso1   ‐0.227**   ‐0.170* 
   (‐2.83)   (‐2.10) 
inno_asso2   ‐0.114   ‐0.0738 
   (‐1.43)   (‐0.92) 
inno_asso3   ‐0.236*   ‐0.214* 
   (‐2.32)   (‐2.09) 
gender 0.00597 0.0179 0.0184 0.00763 0.0183 0.0187 
 (0.20) (0.60) (0.62) (0.26) (0.62) (0.63) 
age ‐0.00268 ‐0.00281 ‐0.00303* ‐0.00259 ‐0.00267 ‐0.00284 
 (‐1.77) (‐1.85) (‐2.00) (‐1.72) (‐1.77) (‐1.89) 
firmage ‐0.00634*** ‐0.00665*** ‐0.00666*** ‐0.00671*** ‐0.00704*** ‐0.00699*** 
 (‐3.73) (‐3.90) (‐3.90) (‐3.99) (‐4.17) (‐4.14) 
iformal 0.155*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.121** 0.122** 0.123** 
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 (4.11) (4.19) (4.17) (3.22) (3.22) (3.24) 
road 0.0974** 0.116** 0.116** 0.0896* 0.105** 0.104** 
 (2.64) (3.14) (3.13) (2.44) (2.87) (2.83) 
rail 0.0547 0.0489 0.0525 0.0549 0.0498 0.0539 
 (1.29) (1.15) (1.23) (1.30) (1.17) (1.26) 
port ‐0.00343 0.00250 ‐0.00234 ‐0.00520 ‐0.000586 ‐0.00448 
 (‐0.08) (0.06) (‐0.05) (‐0.12) (‐0.01) (‐0.10) 
elec 0.334*** 0.337*** 0.341*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 0.335*** 
 (3.39) (3.42) (3.46) (3.38) (3.40) (3.43) 
water ‐0.0150 ‐0.0115 ‐0.0131 ‐0.00958 ‐0.00591 ‐0.00748 
 (‐0.41) (‐0.31) (‐0.35) (‐0.26) (‐0.16) (‐0.20) 
kinh 0.0136 0.0102 0.0139 0.0129 0.00991 0.0122 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.26) (0.24) (0.18) (0.22) 
primary 0.0134 ‐0.00495 ‐0.00417 0.00749 ‐0.00926 ‐0.00806 
 (0.14) (‐0.05) (‐0.04) (0.08) (‐0.10) (‐0.08) 
lower 0.0626 0.0549 0.0547 0.0575 0.0507 0.0515 
 (0.67) (0.59) (0.59) (0.63) (0.56) (0.57) 
upper 0.149 0.149 0.148 0.137 0.137 0.137 
 (1.59) (1.59) (1.58) (1.50) (1.50) (1.51) 
uni 0.114** 0.130** 0.128** 0.0889* 0.101* 0.0994* 
 (2.83) (3.24) (3.19) (2.20) (2.51) (2.47) 
skill 0.102 0.105 0.108 0.106 0.110 0.112 
 (1.75) (1.80) (1.85) (1.82) (1.89) (1.93) 
cadre 0.0969 0.0823 0.0803 0.0951 0.0818 0.0811 
 (1.27) (1.08) (1.06) (1.25) (1.07) (1.07) 
veteran ‐0.0267 ‐0.0189 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0257 ‐0.0185 ‐0.0180 
 (‐0.48) (‐0.34) (‐0.30) (‐0.46) (‐0.33) (‐0.32) 
dv 0.0689 0.0723 0.0717 0.0636 0.0649 0.0663 
 (1.34) (1.41) (1.40) (1.24) (1.27) (1.30) 
worksoe 0.0692 0.0707 0.0743 0.0649 0.0662 0.0691 
 (1.58) (1.61) (1.69) (1.49) (1.51) (1.58) 
worknonsoe 0.103** 0.111** 0.112** 0.0925* 0.0988** 0.0995** 
 (2.72) (2.93) (2.97) (2.46) (2.62) (2.64) 
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selfindus 0.0978 0.0953 0.0960 0.0934 0.0916 0.0914 
 (1.94) (1.90) (1.91) (1.87) (1.85) (1.84) 
selfser 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (3.74) (3.88) (3.90) (3.60) (3.71) (3.74) 
_cons 10.43*** 10.48*** 10.50*** 10.37*** 10.39*** 10.38*** 
 (61.28) (60.17) (54.21) (61.28) (60.35) (53.74) 
N 2494 2494 2494 2494 2494 2494 
R2 0.293 0.287 0.286 0.297 0.291 0.291 
Note: OLS estimation with robust check; province variables are dropped down the table above; and t statistics in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Testing complementarity between innovations and networks 
Dependent variable Variables on which 
complementarity is tested 
One‐sided t‐testa 
Productivity Innovations, Suppliers ‐.037 
 Innovations, Buyers .310 
 Innovations, Associations .671 
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